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Abstract—We design polynomial time schemes for secure mes-
sage transmission over arbitrary networks, in the presence of
an eavesdropper, and where each edge corresponds to an era-
sure channel with public feedback. Our schemes are described
through linear programming (LP) formulations, that explicitly
select (possibly different) sets of paths for key-generation and
message sending. Although our LPs are not always capacity-
achieving, they outperform the best known alternatives in the
literature, and extend to incorporate several interesting scenaria.
.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider the following setup. A source, Alice, is con-
nected to a destination, Bob, over a packet network that can be
represented as an arbitrary directed acyclic graph. Alice wants
to send a message to Bob, securely from a passive eavesdropper,
Eve, who wiretaps an unknown subset of k edges in the network.
Each edge i that connects node u to node v corresponds to a
packet erasure channel with probability δi; when eavesdropping
this edge, Eve also receives the packet transmissions of node
u with erasure probability δiE , independently from node v.
Moreover, we assume that all legitimate nodes in the network, as
well as Eve, causally learn whether v has successfully received
the packets u transmits or not; however, Eve does not report
which packets she successfully receives.
We propose the first, as far as we know, linear programming
(LP) formulation, that explicitly selects paths in the network to
maximize the secure message transmission rate. It is well known
that the (non-secure) capacity of a network can be described
by an LP which allows a natural flow-based interpretation
of network traffic. Our work leverages this formulation to
implement secure message transmission through a two-phase
construction. In the first key-creation phase, Alice establishes
a secret key with Bob; in the second message-sending phase,
she uses the established secret key to encode and securely send
a message. Accordingly, our LP selects two sets of paths (that
share the network resources): key-creation paths, that Alice will
use to share random packets with Bob (so as to create a secret
key), and message-sending paths, that Alice will use to send
the encrypted message. We term this end-to-end encryption
algorithm (Algo 1). We discuss several extensions of Algo 1,
notably Algo 2, that apart from the end-to-end key, also creates
and utilizes link-by-link keys for secure message transmission.
The LPs we propose are not optimal, but are still we believe
interesting. An example where the LPs are suboptimal is the
triangle network, where the capacity was characterized in [1] .
However, there are also a number of examples where the LPs
do achieve the known capacity (such as the two-parallel edges
network, and the line network); they outperform the best known
alternative in the literature in all the cases that we have tested;
and they enable new observations. For instance, over erasure
networks, there are cases where the key-sharing and message-
sending paths use different edges (while over lossless networks,
using the same sets of paths is optimal).
Another attractive attribute of the proposed LPs is their
generality: the LPs take as input the erasure probabilities δi
and δiE at every channel edge i, that can be arbitrary. For
instance, with δi = δiE = 0 we recover the lossless network
case, and the LPs achieve the secure network coding rate (which
is the optimal scheme for lossless channels). Moreover, similarly
to the max-flow LP, our LPs can be extended to incorporate
multiple sources, multiple receivers, edges with costs, etc.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly reviews
related work; Section III introduces our notation; Section IV
presents the algorithms; and Section V has evaluation results.
II. RELATED WORK
Finding the highest achievable rate of secure communication
of an arbitrary network setting is an open research problem. In
the special case when the network consists of error-free, unit
capacity channels, secure network coding is optimal [2]. For
the same problem when the channels are not unit capacity (but
still error-free) restricted complexity results suggest the hardness
of calculating the secret message capacity [3], [4]. When the
network edges are erasure channels all with the same parameters
and channel state feedback, and the paths used for Alice to
communicate with Bob are decided in advance, a secure commu-
nication achievable scheme is proposed in [5]. In contrast, this
work provides schemes for arbitrary erasure channel parameters,
and explicitly selects the best paths in the network so as to
maximize the achievable rates. For a number of small networks
(single channel, V-network, triangle network, line network) with
erasures and state feedback, capacity characterization and a
linear programming formulation were derived in [1], [6], [7],
[8], [?], [9]. Our approach in this work is different: instead
of schemes tailored to specific topologies, we design schemes
that are general and extend to arbitrary network topologies.
A preliminary version of LP formulations (a precursor of the
algorithm we call Algo 1) for this problem was presented as an
invited poster in a workshop [?].
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III. SYSTEM MODEL AND NOTATION
A source s (Alice) wants to send a message W securely to a
destination d (Bob), over a directed acyclic graph G = (V, E),
where each edge g that connects node u to node v represents an
orthogonal discrete memoryless broadcast erasure channel with
two receivers: node v and potentially a passive eavesdropper
(Eve). We denote by Xgi the input to channel g at time slot
i = 1 . . . n; and by Ygi and Zgi the corresponding outputs at
node v and Eve respectively. We assume that Xgi is a length L
vector over a finite field Fq (in the paper we use the convention
that L log(q) = 1). We use  as the symbol of an erasure. The
broadcast channel is conditionally independent, namely
Pr{Y ngi, Zngi|Xngi} =
n∏
i=1
Pr{Ygi|Xgi}Pr{Zgi|Xgi},
with Pr{Ygi|Xgi} =
{
1− δg, Ygi = Xgi
δg, Ygi = ,
and Pr{Zgi|Xgi} =
{
1− δgE , Zgi = Xgi
δgE , Zgi = .
We assume that the source has unlimited private randomness,
and that all other network nodes have no private randomness. We
also assume public state feedback, that is, each legitimate node
sends an ACK (or NACK) so that all other nodes (including
Eve) learn whether the packet transmission was successful. We
use the notation Si−1 for the state of all the channels before
the transmission of the ith symbols. Also the notation Iu and
Ou for the set of the incoming and outgoing edges of node u.
We require security in the strong information theoretical
sense, defined next in the same way as in [5], [7]. We use XAi,
for a set A, to denote the vector (Xgi)g∈A, and XiA to denote
the vector (XA1, XA2, . . . , XAi).
Definition. We say that RSM is an achievable secret message
rate if for any  > 0 and sufficiently large n the following
conditions hold for some functions fgi,n(·),WB,n(·).
For u ∈ U − {s} and for every g ∈ Ou:
Xgi =
{
fgi,n(Y
i−1
Iu
, Si−1) (1)
and for every g ∈ Os: Xgi =
{
fgi,n(W,U0, S
i−1) (2)
where U0 is the unlimited random source of Alice
and where the message W is uniformly distributed over
{1, 2, . . . , 2n(RSM−)}. Bob is able to recover W with high
probability,
Wˆ =WB,n(Y
n
Id
), (3)
Pr{Wˆ 6=W} < . (4)
Eve gains negligible useful information by observing V ⊆ E :
I(W ;ZnV S
n) < , ∀ V ⊆ E . (5)
The supremum of all achievable secret message rates is the
secret message capacity of the network denoted by CSM .
IV. END-TO-END ENCRYPTION ALGORITHM
Broad Approach: The algorithm selects two (possibly
different) sets of paths, one set for key-creation and the other for
message-sending. The source uses the first (key-creation) set of
paths to send random packets to the destination; intermediate
nodes forward the random packets they receive from their
incoming edges to their outgoing edges using two techniques,
ARQ and MDS expansion, as we will describe later in this
section. The source and the destination create an end-to-end
secret key, based on their shared random packets and an estimate
of how many of these Eve has eavesdropped. The algorithm
also selects a second set of paths, over which the source sends
an information message to the destination, encrypted with the
source-destination end-to-end key. Intermediate nodes simply
forward the encrypted packets using ARQ. The goal of the
program is to maximize the rate at which the message can be
send securely to the destination, by optimizing over two things:
1) what are the paths selected for key-creation and message-
sending and 2) and how are the random packets forwarded by
the intermediate nodes.
A. Scheme Description and Algo 1 LP
We start from the case where Eve observes any (one) edge of
the network. All the LP variables express rate of packets, either
message-packets, or random-packets.
Key-creation constraints: The source generates uniform
random packets, to be send to the destination. The interme-
diate nodes collect the random packets they receive from all
their incoming edges, partition them into subsets, and send a
subset to each of their outgoing edges using two techniques,
Automatic Repeat Request (ARQ) and Maximum-Distance-
Seperable (MDS) code expansion. To capture this, for each
edge (channel) g, that connects say vertex u to vertex v, the
LP uses three variables sg , kg and rg . Node u sends kg packets
to node v, by first multiplying these packets with an MDS code
of size kg1−δgδgE × kg to create
kg
1−δgδgE linear combinations,
and then transmitting each linear combination exactly once (we
discuss later why we expand with these parameters). From these
packets, v receives a fraction kg
1−δg
1−δgδgE . Moreover, u also sends
to node v rg packets using ARQ; v receives all these packets.
Node v receives in total rate sg random packets, with
sg = rg + kg
1− δg
1− δgδiE . (6)
If node u has Iu incoming and Ou edges, we have that∑
i∈Iu
si =
∑
j∈Ou
(kj + rj). (7)
This constraint requires that the random packets node u sends
are equal to the random packets it receives; that is, intermediate
network nodes do not discard or generate random packets.
Message-sending constraints: The source encrypts the
message using an end-to-end key (we will describe how later),
and forwards it to the destination; each intermediate node uses
ARQ to forward the encrypted message packets it receives. The
LP uses a variable mg to capture the encrypted message packets
that node u sends to node v through the edge g that connects
them; note that to do so, node u makes mg1−δg transmissions. We
require message flow conservation, i.e.,∑
i∈Iu
mi =
∑
j∈Ou
mj . (8)
Time-sharing (edge capacity) constraints: Random and
encrypted packets need to potentially share the network edges
(channels); we thus require for every edge of the network that
rg
1− δg +
kg
1− δgδgE +
mg
1− δg ≤ 1. (9)
Security constraints: If Eve is located on edge g, she will
overhear a fraction
mg
1− δgE
1− δgδgE
of the encrypted message flow mg through that edge. A neces-
sary condition for our scheme to be secure is that, this amount
of message is smaller than the amount of random packets that
Alice and Bob have and Eve does not, i.e., the secret common
random packets (this condition is also sufficient for security
as we discuss later on). Alice and Bob share
(∑
j∈ID sj
)
random packets; thus if, from these
(∑
j∈ID sj
)
packets, Eve
has overhead say Eg (by observing the random packet flow
through edge g), then the security constraint would be:
mg
1− δgE
1− δgδgE ≤
∑
j∈ID
sj
− Eg.
Conservatively estimating Eve’s knowledge Eg: Consider
again edge g that connects vertex u to vertex v. A conservative
way to estimate Eve’s knowledge, is to set
Eg = rg
1− δgE
1− δgδgE + kg
(1− δgE)(1− δg)
1− δgδgE .
That is, calculate the number of random packets that both node
v and Eve receive. This estimate is conservative because we as-
sume that all the randomness node v receives eventually reaches
the destination (Bob), which is not necessarily true. Indeed,
when nodes forward packets using the MDS expansion, we
"lose" part of the randomness (from the kg random packets, node
u only receives kg
(1−δg)
1−δgδgE ). Algo 1 uses this approximation.
Message encryption at the source: The LP identifies the
rate R at which we can send an encrypted message, and the rates
mg of the message that flow through each edge. We encrypt the
message using a one-time pad approach and a key of size R,
that we create by multiplying the
∑
si packets that Bob receives
with an R×∑ si MDS matrix.
B. Discussion
Why use MDS expansion at intermediate nodes: When the
network consists of a single edge, the optimal key-generation
scheme has Alice generate uniform at random packets and send
these to Bob [7]; this has the advantage that packets that Eve
receives and Bob does not, give no information to Eve about the
packets Bob receives. Using MDS at intermediate nodes mimics
this effect more efficiently: the observation is that, if Alice sends
Algo 1 LP with end-to-end encryption and Eg approximation
Input: Set of erasure probabilities δg and δgE
Output: Secure message rate and achievability scheme parameters
maxR, s.t.:
R =
∑
i∈ID
mi
∀u ∈ V − {s, d} :∑
i∈Iu
mi =
∑
j∈Ou
mj∑
i∈Iu
si =
∑
j∈Ou
(kj + rj)
∀g ∈ E :
sg = rg + kg
1− δg
1− δgδgE
1 ≥ rg
1− δg +
kg
1− δgδgE +
mg
1− δg
mg
1− δgE
1− δgδgE ≤
∑
j∈ID
sj
− rg 1− δgE
1− δgδgE
− kg (1− δgE)(1− δg)
1− δgδgE
∀ i : mi, si, ki, ri ≥ 0.
uniform at random packets, there exist some packets that neither
Bob nor Eve receive; thus in a sense these packets do not serve
any purpose. To avoid this, Alice can simply expand the k
packets to k1−δδE packets. MDS combining has the property that
Eve cannot learn anything about the packets that Bob receives,
from the packets that only she (and not Bob) has collected. This
observation and the corresponding proof were provided in [9].
The LP selects what fraction of the packets to send using MDS,
and what fraction to send using ARQ, separately for each edge.
ARQ has the advantage that it preserves all random packets,
and the disadvantage that Eve learns more about the packets
that Bob collects.
Why ARQ for message sending: ARQ is a capacity achiev-
ing strategy over erasure channels, as is also erasure coding.
However, when we are interested in secure message sending,
if we were to take the message, encrypt it with a one-time
pad, and then use erasure correcting coding to transmit it to
Bob, we would get a worse performance than if we send the
encrypted message with ARQ. This is beacuse, with erasure
coding, every packet Eve receives gives her new information
about the information message; however, with ARQ, she may
receive repeated packets, that bring her no new information.
Exact calculation of Eg: One method is similar to the
standard path-LP formulation of the (non-secure) max flow
LP, i.e., the LP that assigns rates to each of the paths that
connect a source to a destination. To calculate Eg , we associate
with each path p a random packet flow sp that captures the
delivered random packets through that path from Alice to Bob.
We can then calculate how many of the packets Bob receives
are delivered through paths that include edge g, and remove the
fraction that Eve overhears. This approach has a compact LP
form and is illustrated in Algo 2. Although this formulation has
exponential complexity, it is also possible to exactly calculate
Eg in polynomial time (see Appendix). For this, we need to
assume that network nodes do an additional operation: every
node in the network uniformly at random mixes its incoming
random packets before forwarding them towards Bob; we thus
ensure that "all packets are treated equally". We then reduce the
problem to calculating, what fraction of random packets that go
through a given node, reach Bob.
C. Analysis
Why the scheme is secure: This follows directly by apply-
ing Theorems 10 and 11 of [9] as well as Lemma 4 of [6]. For
completeness we include a proof in the Appendix.
Reduction to secure network coding: By setting δi =
δiE = 1 for every edge of the network, the solution of the Algo
1 LP gives the same result as secure network coding. Indeed, if
we assume that the mincut equals h, selecting h edge-disjoint
paths, and using h − 1 of them to end the encrypted message
and one to send random packets for key generation, is a feasible
solution. From [2] it is also an optimal solution for this network.
Suboptimality: The achievability algorithm we presented
is suboptimal, not only because it uses an estimate for Ei, but
also because it only creates an end-to-end key; we know from
the work in [1], that, to achieve the capacity in some cases, even
when the intermediate nodes do not have private randomness,
we need to create and explore common randomness they have
by receiving the same source-generated random packets, leading
to an exponential complexity problem [3], [4].
Optimality in some cases: In some cases where the secure
message capacity is known, we can prove that Algo 1 (or Algo
2 we describe later) are optimal. For illustration, we provide
in the Appendix a proof that Algo 1 is optimal when Alice
is connected to Bob through two parallel channels. Algo 2
achieves the capacity of the line network, as again shown in
the Appendix.
D. Extensions
Given the framework of Algo 1, we can directly extend it
in a number of cases, as is also the case for the max flow LP,
albeit at additional complexity cost in some cases. For instance,
we can extend it to address the following:
1. Link-by-link key creation (see for example Algo 2).
2. Multicasting to more than one receivers (following a similar
approach to the network coding LP in [5], [?]).
3. Eve wiretaps more than one edges (if Eve eavesdrops V
edges, Eg would be the amount of random packets Eve has
collected by eavesdropping on edge g plus V −1 arbitrary other
edges. We provide such an LP in the Appendix for illustration.)
4. Multiple sources not collocated transmitting messages to the
same receiver (in this case, we can combine random packets
across sources to create link by link keys; see Appendix).
5. Having costs associated with edges (similarly to [9]).
Algo 2 LP with end-to-end and link-by-link encryption, and
with Eg exact calculation
Input: Set of erasure probabilities δg and δgE
Output: Secure message rate and achievability scheme parameters
maxR, s.t.:
R =
∑
i∈ID
mi
∀u ∈ V − {s, d} :∑
i∈Iu
mi =
∑
j∈Ou
mj∑
i∈Iu
si ≥
∑
j∈Ou
(kj + rj)
∀g ∈ E :
sg = rg + kg
1− δg
1− δgδgE
1 ≥ rg
1− δg +
kg
1− δgδgE +
mg
1− δg
(10)
sg =
∑
p∈P :g∈p
sp (11)
mg
1− δgE
1− δgδgE ≤ (kg + rg)
δgE(1− δg)
1− δgδgE +
∑
p∈P ′−g
sp
∀ i, p : mi, si, sp, ki, ri ≥ 0.
Algo 2 description: In this algorithm the message is
encrypted both with an end-to-end key, and a link-by-link key
(that is applied and peeled off at every edge). The source again
selects two (possibly different) sets of paths, one set for random-
packet-sending and the other for message-sending. An end-
to-end key is created from these random packets. The source
encrypts all the packets with this end-to-end key and transmits
them appropriately through the message-sending paths.
Furthermore, node u (connected to node v through edge g)
may also apply an additional link-by-link key, that node v will
remove before further forwarding and potentially re-encrypting
the message. Note that u may send to node v more random
packets than what node v can forward to Bob, as these extra
packets are still useful to create a larger link-by-link key for
edge g. Algo 2 uses all the sg random packets to create the
link-by-link key. These packets can no longer contribute to the
end-to-end key that will also protect the message mg through
edge g, and need to be accounted for.
Algo 2 exactly calculates how many of the sg packets reach
Bob, through a path flow-decomposition approach. We denote
with P the set of all paths in the network that begin from the
source, with P ′ all the Alice-Bob paths, and with P
′
−g all Alice-
Bob paths that do not utilize edge g. The LP assigns values to
each message-path-flow sp and of course it is,
sg =
∑
p∈P :g∈p
sp.
For the calculation of the key for edge g:
The link-by-link key is calculated as the random packets that
pass through edge g and are not heard by Eve,
(kg + rg)
δgE(1− δg)
1− δgδgE .
The end-by-end key is calculated as the random packets that
were transmitted to the destination without passing through edge
g, ∑
p∈P ′−g
sp.
Since we are protecting from an Eve at edge g, we are sure
that all these packets are secure.
Thus the security condition becomes,
mg
1− δgE
1− δgδgE ≤ (kg + rg)
δgE(1− δg)
1− δgδgE +
∑
p∈P ′−g
sp.
The LP can choose among many different path-flows for the
messages in order to achieve the same sg for all edges g. The
optimal choice is the one that maximizes the secure message
sending rate.
V. EVALUATION
We used numerical evaluations (through matlab) to solve the
LPs over specific configurations where the capacity is known.
We verified that:
• Selecting paths helps. The optimal message-sending and key-
creation sets of paths in several instances did not share all edges.
Such an example is provided in Fig. 1(a).
• Generating keys using MDS helps. Fig. 2(a) shows the
performance we get over a two-hop line network (Fig. 1(b) with
N = 2), when: 1) we allow the LP in Algo 1 to only use ARQ
for the random packets propagation to the destination, and 2)
we use both ARQ and MDS for the same purpose. The benefits
of using MDS in this case are clear. Note that over the line
network secure network coding achieves zero rate.
• Algo 1 is suboptimal, Fig. 2(c) compares the performance
of Algo 1 with the capacity of the two-hop line network [9];
when Eve only wiretaps the first channel, and the first channel is
better than the second, the optimal strategy uses a link-by-link
key; Algo 1 cannot do this. Algo 2, that can do so, achieves the
capacity.
• Using link-by-link keys can help. See previous point.
• We achieve benefits over secure network coding. We compare
Algo 1 against using channel coding followed by secure network
coding. Fig. 2(b) considers a configuration where Alice is
connected to Bob through multiple parallel channels; this is a
"worse case" configuration in terms of expected benefits, as the
main opportunity to create keys comes from the number of paths
(and not erasures), that secure network coding also leverages.
The constant benefits Algo 1 offers are exactly due to exploiting
the erasures over the edge that Eve wiretaps.
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(a) Message-sending and key-creation paths can be different: the
upper path is used only for message flow, the lower path is shared.
We depict the optimal values Algo I has selected.
(b) Line network with N + 1 nodes.
Figure 1. Network configurations.
(a) Two hop line network with δ2Ε = δ1Ε = δΕ,
δ1 = 0.2, δ2 = 0.8.
(b) Multiple parallel channels with δiΕ = 0.8, δi =
0.6 for i odd, and δiΕ = 0.9, δi = 0.6 for i even.
(c) Two hop line network with δ1Ε = 0.5, δ2Ε = 1,
δ2 = 0.6.
Figure 2. Evaluation results through matlab.
VI. APPENDIX
We provide the following at the interested reviewer’s discre-
tion: A) Optimality of Algo 1 for two parallel channels; B)
Optimality of Algo 2 for line network; C) Calculation of Eg in
polynomial time; D) Security of Algo 1; and E) Examples of
extending the LPs.
A. Optimality of Algo 1 for the two parallel channels network
The outerbound in [?] for the two parallel channels is:
maxM, s.t.:
M = (1− δ1)M1 + (1− δ2)M2
1 ≥ C1 +M1
1 ≥ C2 +M2
M1
(1− δ1E)(1− δ1)
1− δ1δ1E ≤ C2(1− δ2) + C1(1− δ1)δ1E
M2
(1− δ2E)(1− δ2)
1− δ2δ2E ≤ C1(1− δ1) + C2(1− δ2)δ2E .
A feasible solution for the Algo 1 LP is r1 = 0, r2 = 0.
In this case, making the correspondence mi → (1 − δi)Mi ,
ki/(1 − δiδiE) → Ci for i = {1, 2}, we can see that the two
LPs are equivalent. Thus the end-to-end encryption algorithm
achieves the capacity of the parallel channels network.
B. Optimality of Algo 2 for line network
The outerbound derived in [9] for the line network is:
max m,
s.t. ∀j ∈ N :
1− δjE
1− δjδjEm ≤ kj
kj
(1− δj)δjE +
m
1− δj ≤ 1
kj ≤ dj−1 δjE(1− δj)
1− δjδjE
dj +m ≤ 1− δj
dj ≤ dj−1, j > 1
In this case there is only one path and Algo 2 becomes
equivalent to the outerbound of the line network, and thus
achieves the capacity of the line network.
C. Exact calculation of Eg
The LP in Algo 3 achieves a polynomial time calculation
of Eg . As we mentioned in the paper, to do so, we need to
assume that network nodes do an additional operation: every
node in the network uniformly at random mixes its incoming
random packets before forwarding them towards Bob; we thus
ensure that "all packets are treated equally". We then reduce
the problem to calculating, what fraction of random packets
that go through a given node, reach Bob. Note that Alice needs
to know the linear combinations of the random packets to be
able to reproduce them when establishing the secret key with
Bob.
Consider a directed acyclic graph, where there is an implicit
partial ordering of edges. We say that edge g < j if there exists
a directed path that connects edge g to j. The basic idea in the
LP is to keep track of what amount, of the random packets sg
at edge g, are part to the random packets in sj , with g < j.
Algo 3 Same as Algo 1 but with exact Ei calculation in
polynomial time.
Input: Set of erasure probabilities δi and δiE .
Output: Secure message rate and achiev. scheme parameters
maxR, s.t.:
R =
∑
i∈ID
mi
∀u ∈ V − {s, d} : (12)∑
i∈Iu
mi =
∑
j∈Ou
mj∑
i∈Iu
sii =
∑
j∈Ou
(kj + rj)
∀g ∈ E :
sgg = rg + kg
1− δg
1− δgδgE
1 ≥ rg
1− δg +
kg
1− δgδgE +
mg
1− δg
∀u ∈ V − {s, d},
∀g ∈ E :∑
j∈Ou
sgj ≥
∑
j∈Iu
sgj −
∑
j∈Iu
sjj −
∑
j∈Ou
sjj

∀g, j ∈ E :
sgj ≤ sjj
∀g ∈ E :
mg
1− δgE
1− δgδgE ≤
∑
j∈Id
sj
−
−
[∑
j∈Id sgj − kg
1− δg
1− δgδgE
]+
1− δgE
1− δgδgE
−min{∑j∈Id sgj , kg 1− δg1− δgδgE }(1− δgE).
mi, sij , ki, ri ≥ 0, ∀i, j.
In the LP, the variables sgj are used to denote random packets
that have passed through edge g and also through edge j, with
g < j. For consistency of notation, we use sgg instead of sg .
We think of the sgj as "virtual flows", similarly to the
approach in [?]. Thus, we require that
∀g, j ∈ E ,with g < j, sgj ≤ sjj
Consider now a node u. The quantity
A =
∑
j∈Iu
sjj −
∑
j∈Ou
sjj
captures how many of the random packets that are incoming to
node u, reach the "next hop" nodes towards Bob. The quantity
B =
∑
j∈Iu
sgj −
∑
j∈Ou
sgj
is the virtual flow in these packets that has also passed through
g. We require in the LP that
B ≤ A.
Because intermediate nodes form and propagate linear combi-
nations of packets, we can let the LP assign (consistently with
the constraints) virtual flow values that maximize the secure
message rate. We calculate the part of sg that Bob received as∑
j∈Id sgj . Note that the last equation (that includes the min)
can be easily written in linear form.
D. Security for Algo 1
As mentioned earlier, security follows directly by applying
Theorems 10 and 11 of [9] as well as Lemma 4 of [6]. For
completeness we include here a proof; this does not use the
above but follows the proof approach in [9].
We denote by,
bg = mg
1− δgE
1− δgδgEN
cg =
∑
j∈ID
sj
− (rg + kg(1− δg)) 1− δgE
1− δgδgE
N
+Θ(N3/4).
The cg are (with high probability) the number of secure
packets that Bob has received after N time slots, given that:
1. All the packets that passed through edge g actually reached
Bob (conservative assumption), 2. Edge g was the one that
was eavesdropped. This concentration result is proved, using
the Chernoff-Hoeffding bound, as follows,
Pr{|Cg − cg| ≥ N3/4|GE = g} = exp
(
−
√
N
4
)
= o(N),
where Cg is the random variable of the number of secure
packets that Bob has received after N time slots. Also, we use
the random variable GE to denote the edge that is eavesdropped.
It is,
I(W ;ZnSn) = I(W ;WI),
where with WI we denote the packets that are heard by Eve
and I is the set of indices of these overheard columns. We know
that,
H(WI | |I| = i, GE = g) ≤ i.
Furthermore, from the MDS property of the A matrix, we
have,
H(WI |W, |I| = i, GE = g) = H(QA|W, |I| = i, GE = g)
≥ min {i, cg}
Thus,
I(W ;ZnSn)
= H(WI)−H(WI |W )
≤
∑
g∈G
(Pr{GE = g}
N∑
i=0
Pr{|I| = i|GE = g}
(i−min {i, cg}))
≤
∑
g∈G
(Pr{GE = g}
N∑
i=0
Pr{|I| > cg|GE = g}
(i−min {i, cg}))
We need a concentration result for |I| by using the erasure
channel probabilities. By inspecting the ARQ scheme, the
probability that a given encrypted message pakcet is received
correctly by Eve is,
p = (1− δgE) + δgδgE(1− δgE) + · · · = 1− δgE
1− δgδgE .
Then, |I| can be seen as a sum of mgN independent random
variables on {0, 1} drawn from a Bernoulli Ber(p) distribution.
So, we have that,
E[|I|] = mgN 1− δE
1− δδE = bg.
And, from the Chernoff-Hoeffding bound,
Pr{|I| > cg|GE = g} = Pr {|I| ≥ bg + (cg − bg)} ≤ exp
(
− (cg − bg)
4
)
.
Thus,
I(W ;ZnSn) ≤
∑
g∈G
(Pr{GE = g}
N∑
i=0
exp
(
− (cg − bg)
4
)
(i−min {i, cg})),
which goes to zero as N grows.
E. Extensions of LPs
We here provide LPs that extend Algo 1 & Algo 2, as
discussed in Section IV-D.
1) Algo 4: Eve observing multiple edges: Algo 4 presents a
case where Eve observes multiple (V ) edges; what changes in
this case is that, Ei needs to account for all packets that Eve
(and Bob) may have received, when Eve wiretaps edge i and
any other V − 1 edges. Algo 4 is a variation of Algo 1; note
that its complexity increases exponentially with the number of
wiretapped edges V .
In particular, we follow the conservative assumption that all
the eavesdropped packets reach Bob, and they are all different
to each other (which may not be since the same packet may be
heard again by Eve in a different edge). Thus, in the security
constraint of the LP we subtract from the total number of Alice-
Bob shared packets, the number of packets that were heard by
Eve in all the channels she overhears,
mg
1− δgE
1− δgδgE ≤
∑
j∈ID
sj
− ∑
g∈GE
rg
1− δgE
1− δgδgE
Algo 4 Eve observing multiple edges
Input: Set of erasure probabilities δi and δiE , number of
eavesdropped edges V.
Output: Secure message rate and achievability scheme parameters
maxR, s.t.:
R =
∑
i∈ID
mi
∀u ∈ V − {s, d} :∑
i∈Iu
mi =
∑
j∈Ou
mj∑
i∈Iu
si ≥
∑
j∈Ou
(kj + rj)
∀g ∈ E :
sg = rg + kg
1− δg
1− δgδgE
1 ≥ rg
1− δg +
kg
1− δgδgE +
mg
1− δg
∀GE ⊂
V
E ,∀g ∈ GE :
mg
1− δgE
1− δgδgE ≤
∑
j∈ID
sj
− ∑
g∈GE
rg
1− δgE
1− δgδgE
−
∑
g∈GE
kg
(1− δgE)(1− δg)
1− δgδgE .
mi, si, ki, ri ≥ 0, ∀i.
−
∑
g∈GE
kg
(1− δgE)(1− δg)
1− δgδgE .
The notation GE ⊂
V
E denotes that GE is a subset of E with
cardinality V .
2) Algo 5: Multiple sources: Algorithm Algo 5 presents the
extension of Algo 2 in the case where there are L sources, and
each has a different message to send to a common destination.
At a first glance, it might seem that the best we could do would
simply be time-sharing between L different secure message
transmissions (from the L sources to the receiver). However,
during the key-creation phase, we can exploit random packets
originating from a given source, say source one, to create link-
by-link keys that will be used to better protect a message send
by say a source two. In particular, we can pull together the
randomness generated by all sources to create a "universal" link-
by-link key that protects all messages through that link.
We denote by mli the message rate at edge i of the packets
of source l. We use the notation sli, rli, kli. We impose a time
sharing (capacity) constraints at each edge, for the sum of the
packets that flow in that edge:
1 ≥
L∑
l=1
rlg
1− δg +
L∑
l=1
klg
1− δgδgE +
L∑
l=1
mlg
1− δg
Algo 5 LP with multiple sources located on different nodes
Input: Set of erasure probabilities δi and δiE .
Output: Secure message rate and achievability scheme parameters
max
L∑
l=1
Rl, s.t.:
∀l ∈ [1, L] :
Rl =
∑
i∈ID
mli
∀u ∈ V − {s, d},∀l ∈ [1, L] :∑
i∈Iu
mli =
∑
j∈Ou
mlj∑
i∈Iu
sli ≥
∑
j∈Ou
(klj + rlj)
∀g ∈ E :
1 ≥
L∑
l=1
rlg
1− δg +
L∑
l=1
klg
1− δgδgE +
L∑
l=1
mlg
1− δg
L∑
l=1
wlg ≤
(
L∑
l=1
(rlg + klg)
)
δgE(1− δg)
1− δgδgE
∀g ∈ E ,∀l ∈ [1, L] :
slg = rlg + klg
1− δg
1− δgδgE
slg =
∑
p∈P :g∈p
slp
mlg
1− δgE
1− δgδgE ≤ wlg +
∑
p∈P ′−g
slp
mij , sij , kij , rij , wij ≥ 0, ∀i, j.
Each source functions independently, sending random packets,
creating the end-to-end key and encrypting its message with it.
This key is shared only between the specific sender and Bob.
Thus we cannot use it to encrypt end-to-end the messages of
the other sources. However, all the random packets (from all
sources) that flow through an edge can be used to create one
universal link-by-link key. This key can be used to encrypt all
the packets (with link-by-link encryption), since the key will be
pealed of in the next node. Thus the size of the key is,(
L∑
l=1
(rlg + klg)
)
δgE(1− δg)
1− δgδgE .
We denote with wlg the amount will used in for the link-by-link
encryption of the message of transmitter l. Of course, the total
amount of these parts cannot be bigger that the amount of the
universal key we created,
L∑
l=1
wlg ≤
(
L∑
l=1
(rlg + klg)
)
δgE(1− δg)
1− δgδgE
In the security constraint, wlg takes the place of the link-by-link
key in edge g for the message of transmitter l,
mlg
1− δgE
1− δgδgE ≤ wlg +
∑
p∈P ′−g
slp.
